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Learning-based Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
Mohammad Javad Khojasteh, Anatoly Khina, Massimo Franceschetti, and Tara Javidi
Abstract—We introduce the problem of learning-based attacks
in a simple abstraction of cyber-physical systems—the case of a
discrete-time, linear, time-invariant plant that may be subject to
an attack that overrides the sensor readings and the controller
actions. The attacker attempts to learn the dynamics of the plant
and subsequently overrides the controller’s actuation signal, to
destroy the plant without being detected. The attacker can feed
fictitious sensor readings to the controller using its estimate of the
plant dynamics and mimic the legitimate plant operation. The
controller, on the other hand, is constantly on the lookout for an
attack; once the controller detects an attack, it immediately shuts
the plant off. In the case of scalar plants, we derive an upper
bound on the attacker’s deception probability for any measurable
control policy when the attacker uses an arbitrary learning
algorithm to estimate the system dynamics. We then derive lower
bounds for the attacker’s deception probability for both scalar
and vector plants by assuming an authentication test that inspects
the empirical variance of the system disturbance. We also show
how the controller can improve the security of the system by
superimposing a carefully crafted privacy-enhancing signal on
top of the “nominal control policy.” Finally, for nonlinear scalar
dynamics that belong to the Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space
(RKHS), we investigate the performance of attacks based on
nonlinear Gaussian-processes (GP) learning algorithms.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems security, learning for
dynamics and control, secure control, system identification, man-
in-the-middle attack, physical-layer authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advances in wireless communications
and computation, and their integration into networked control
and cyber-physical systems (CPS), open the door to a myriad
of new and exciting applications, including cloud robotics
and automation [2]. However, the distributed nature of CPS
is often a source of vulnerability. Security breaches in CPS
can have catastrophic consequences ranging from hampering
the economy by obtaining financial gain, to hijacking au-
tonomous vehicles and drones, to terrorism by manipulating
life-critical infrastructures [3]–[5]. Real-world instances of
security breaches in CPS, that were discovered and made
public, include the revenge sewage attack in Maroochy Shire,
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Australia; the Ukraine power grid cyber-attack; the German
steel mill cyber-attack; the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant
attack in Ohio, USA; and the Iranian uranium-enrichment
facility attack via the Stuxnet malware [6]. Studying and pre-
venting such security breaches via control-theoretic methods
has received a great deal of attention in recent years [7]–[24].
An important and widely studied class of attacks in CPS
is based on the “man-in-the-middle” (MITM) paradigm [25]:
an attacker overrides the sensor signals transmitted from the
physical plant to the controller with fake signals that mimic
stable and safe operation. At the same time, the attacker also
overrides the control signals with malicious inputs to push the
plant toward a catastrophic trajectory. It follows that CPS must
constantly monitor the plant outputs and look for anomalies
in the fake sensor signals to detect such attacks. The attacker,
on the other hand, aims to generate fake sensor readings in a
way that would be indistinguishable from the legitimate ones.
The MITM attack has been extensively studied in two
special cases [25]–[29]. The first case is the replay attack,
in which the attacker observes and records the legitimate
system behavior for a given time window and then replays this
recording periodically at the controller’s input [26]–[28]. The
second case is the statistical-duplicate attack, which assumes
that the attacker has acquired complete knowledge of the
dynamics and parameters of the system, and can construct
arbitrarily long fictitious sensor readings that are statistically
identical to the actual signals [25], [29], [30]. The replay
attack assumes no knowledge of the system parameters—and
as a consequence, it is relatively easy to detect. An effective
way to counter the replay attack consists of superimposing
a random watermark signal, unknown to the attacker, on
top of the control signal [30]–[34]. The statistical-duplicate
attack assumes full knowledge of the system dynamics—and
as a consequence, it requires a more sophisticated detection
procedure, as well as additional assumptions on the attacker
or controller behavior to ensure it can be detected. To combat
the attacker’s full knowledge, the controller may adopt moving
target [35]–[38] or baiting [39], [40] techniques. Alternatively,
the controller may introduce private randomness in the con-
trol input using watermarking [29]. In this scenario, a vital
assumption is made: although the attacker observes the true
sensor readings, it is barred from observing the control actions,
as otherwise, it would be omniscient and undetectable.
Our contributions are as follows. First, we observe that
in many practical situations the attacker does not have full
knowledge of the system and cannot simulate a statistically
indistinguishable copy of the system. On the other hand, the
attacker can carry out more sophisticated attacks than simply
replaying previous sensor readings, by attempting to “learn”
the system dynamics from the observations. For this reason, we
study learning-based attacks, in which the attacker attempts
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to learn a model of the plant dynamics, and show that they
can outperform replay attacks on linear systems by providing
a lower bound on the attacker’s deception probability using
a simple learning algorithm. Secondly, we derive a converse
bound on the attacker’s deception probability in the special
case of scalar systems. This holds for any (measurable) control
policy, and for any learning algorithm that may be used by
the attacker to estimate the dynamics of the plant. These
contributions regard the possibility of performing learning-
based attacks. Another contribution regards the way to defend
the system against these attacks. For any learning algorithm
utilized by the attacker to estimate the dynamics of the plant,
we show that adding a proper privacy-enhancing signal to the
“nominal control policy” can lower the deception probability.
Finally, we offer a treatment for nonlinear scalar dynamics
that belong to a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS),
by studying the performance of a nonlinear attack based on
machine-learning GP algorithms.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the attacker has full
access to both sensor and control signals. The controller, on the
other hand, has perfect knowledge of the system dynamics and
tries to discover the attack from the observations that are ma-
liciously injected by the attacker. This assumed information-
pattern imbalance between the controller and the attacker is
justified since the controller is tuned in much longer than the
attacker and thus has knowledge of the system dynamics to a
far greater precision than the attacker. On the other hand, the
attacker can completely hijack the sensor and control signals
that travel through a communication network that has been
compromised. Previous watermarking techniques [26], [29],
[30] are only effective at securing the system if the attacker
has no access to the control signals, which is not the case
here. On the other hand, since in our case, the attacker does
not have full knowledge of the system dynamics, our privacy-
enhancing signal is used to hamper the learning process of
the attacker during the learning phase, rather than providing
a unique signature to the control signal as in the case of
watermarking.
Since in our setting the success or failure of the attacker is
dictated by its learning capabilities, our work is also related to
recent studies in learning-based control [41]–[50]. In contrast
to these works, where tools developed in machine learning
are used to design controllers in the presence of uncertainty,
our work assumes a setting in which the controller has perfect
knowledge of the system dynamics and tries to discover a
possible attack from the observations. At the same time, the
attacker aims to learn the system dynamics, to construct a
carefully crafted fictitious sensor reading signal to fool the
controller. Thus, the security guarantees in this work are
achieved by analyzing the performance and limitations of
learning algorithms.
Learning-based attacks are also related to the Known-
Plaintext Attacks (KPA), introduced in [51], in linear systems
with linear controllers. Using pole–zero analysis from classical
system identification, [51] investigates necessary and sufficient
conditions for which the system is identifiable by an attacker
and, as a result, vulnerable against KPA. To combat KPA,
[51] utilizes low-rank linear controllers that trade control
(a) Learning: During this phase, the attacker eavesdrops and learns the
system, without altering the input signal to the controller (Yk = Xk).
(b) Hijacking: During this phase, the attacker hijacks the system and
intervenes as a MITM in two places: acting as a fake plant for the
controller (Yk = Vk) by impersonating the legitimate sensor, and as
a malicious controller (Ũk) for the plant aiming to destroy the plant.
Fig. 1: System model during learning-based attack phases.
performance for security.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. The
notations used in this work are detailed in Sec. I-A. For ease of
exposition, we start by presenting the problem for the special
case of scalar linear plants in Sec. II, and present our main
results for this case in Sec. III. We then extend the model and
treatment to vector linear and scalar nonlinear plants in Sec. IV
and App. A available online in [52], respectively. We conclude
the paper in Sec. V with a discussion of future directions. Due
to space constraints, the appendices (and some of the proofs)
are available online in [52].
A. Notation
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation. We
denote by N the set of natural numbers, and by R—the set of
real numbers. All logarithms, denoted by log, are base 2. We
denote by ‖·‖ the Euclidean norm of a vector, and by ‖·‖op—
the operator norm induced by it when applied to a matrix.
We denote by † the transpose operation of a matrix. For two
real-valued functions g and h, g(x) = O (h(x)) as x → x0
means lim supx→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| < ∞, and g(x) = o (h(x))
as x → x0 means limx→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| = 0. We denote by
xji = (xi, · · · , xj) the realization of the tuple of random
variables Xji = (Xi, · · · , Xj) for i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j. Random
matrices are represented by boldface capital letters (e.g. A) and
their realizations are represented by typewriter boldface letters
(e.g. A). A  B means that A−B is a positive semidefinite
matrix, namely  is the Loewner order of Hermitian matrices.
λmax(A) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A.
We represent the random vector with boldface small letters,
and xji = (xi, · · · , xj) for i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j. Px denotes the
distribution of the random vector x with respect to (w.r.t.)
probability measure P, whereas fx denotes its probability
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density function (PDF) w.r.t. to the Lebesgue measure, if it
has one. An event is said to happen almost surely (a.s.) if it
occurs with probability one. For real numbers a and b, a b
means a is much less than b, in some numerical sense, while
for probability distributions P and Q, P  Q means P is
absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q. dP/dQ denotes the Radon–
Nikodym derivative of P w.r.t. Q. The Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence between probability distributions PX and PY is
defined as
D(PX‖PY ) ,
EPX
[
log
dPX
dPY
]
, PX  PY ;
∞, otherwise,
where EPX denotes the expectation w.r.t. probability mea-
sure PX . The conditional KL divergence between probability
distributions PY |X and QY |X averaged over PX is defined
as D
(
PX|Y
∥∥QY |X ∣∣PX) , EPX̃ [D (PY |X=X̃∥∥∥QY |X=X̃)],
where (X, X̃) are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). The mutual information between random variables
X and Y is defined as I(X;Y ) , D (PXY ‖PXPY ). The
conditional mutual information between random variables X
and Y given random variable Z is defined as I(X;Y |Z) ,
EPZ̃
[
I(X;Y |Z = Z̃)
]
, where (Z, Z̃) are i.i.d.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the networked control system depicted in
Fig. 1, where the plant dynamics are described by a scalar,
discrete-time, linear time-invariant (LTI) system
Xk+1 = aXk + Uk +Wk, (1)
where Xk, a, Uk, Wk are real numbers representing the plant
state, open-loop gain of the plant, control input, and plant
disturbance, respectively, at time k ∈ N. The controller, at
time k, observes Yk and generates a control signal Uk as a
function of Y k1 . If the attacker does not tamper sensor reading,
at any time k ∈ N, we have Yk = Xk. We assume that the
initial condition X0 has a known (to all parties) distribution
and is independent of the disturbance sequence {Wk}. For
analytical purposes, we assume that the process {Wk} has
i.i.d. Gaussian samples of zero mean and variance σ2 that is
known to all parties. We assume, without loss of generality,
that W0 = 0, E [X0] = 0, and take U0 = 0. Moreover, to
simplify the notation, let Zk , (Xk, Uk) denote the state-and-
control input at time k and its trajectory up to time k—by
Zk1 , (X
k
1 , U
k
1 ).
The controller is equipped with a detector that tests for
anomalies in the observed history Y k1 . When the controller
detects an attack, it shuts the system down and prevents the
attacker from causing further “damage” to the plant. The
controller/detector is aware of the plant dynamics (1) and
knows the open-loop gain a of the plant. On the other hand,
the attacker knows the plant dynamics (1) as well as the plant
state Xk, and control input Uk (or equivalently, Zk) at time k
(see Fig. 1). However, it does not know the open-loop gain a.
We assume the open-loop gain is fixed in time, but unknown
to the attacker (as in the frequentist approach [53]). Never-
theless, it will be convenient, for algorithm aid, to assume
a prior over the open-loop gain of the plant, and treat it as a
random variable A, that is fixed across time, whose PDF fA is
known to the attacker, and whose realization a is known to the
controller (cf. Sec. V-D). We assume all random variables to
exist on a common probability space with probability measure
P, and Uk to be a measurable function of Y k1 for all time
k ∈ N. We also denote the probability measure conditioned on
A = a by Pa. Namely, for any measurable event C, we define
Pa(C) = P(C|A = a).
A is assumed to be independent of X0 and {Wk|k ∈ N}.
A. Learning-based Attacks
We now define Learning-based attacks that consist of two
disjoint, consecutive, passive and active phases (cf. Sec. V-C).
Phase 1: Learning. During this phase, the attacker passively
observes the control input and the plant state to learn the open-
loop gain of the plant. As illustrated in Fig. 1a, for all k ∈
[0, L], the attacker observes the control input Uk and the plant
state Xk, and tries to learn the open-loop gain a, where L
is the duration of the learning phase. We denote by Â the
attacker’s estimate of the open-loop gain a. •
Phase 2: Hijacking. In this phase, the attacker aims to
destroy the plant via Ũk while remaining undetected. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1b, from time L+ 1 and onward the attacker hi-
jacks the system and feeds a malicious control signal Ũk to the
plant and a fictitious sensor reading Yk = Vk to the controller.•
We assume that the attacker can use any arbitrary learning
algorithm to estimate the open-loop gain a during the learning
phase, and when the estimation is completed, we assume that
during the hijacking phase the fictitious sensor reading is con-
structed, in a model-based manner (cf. Sec. V-B), as follows
Vk+1 = ÂVk + Uk + W̃k , k = L, . . . , T − 1, (2)
where W̃k for k = L, . . . , T − 1 are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, σ2);
Uk is the control signal generated by the controller, which is
fed with the fictitious virtual signal Vk by the attacker; VL =
XL; and Â is the estimate of the open-loop gain of the plant
at the conclusion of Phase 1.
B. Detection
The controller/detector, being aware of the dynamic (1) and
the open-loop gain a, attempts to detect possible attacks by
testing for statistical deviations from the typical behavior of
the system (1). More precisely, under the legitimate system
operation (corresponding to the null hypothesis), the controller
observation Yk behaves according to
Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 ) ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2). (3)
In the case of an attack, during Phase 2 (k > L), (3) can be
rewritten as
Vk+1 − aVk − Uk = Vk+1 − aVk + ÂVk − ÂVk − Uk (4a)
= W̃k +
(
Â− a
)
Vk, (4b)
where (4b) follows from (2). Hence, the estimation error (Â−
a) dictates the ease with which an attack can be detected.
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Since the Gaussian PDF with zero mean is fully charac-
terized by its variance, we shall follow [29], and test for
anomalies in the latter, i.e., test whether the empirical variance
of (3) is equal to the second moment of the plant disturbance
E
[
W 2
]
. To that end, we shall use a test that sets a confidence
interval of length 2δ > 0 around the expected variance, i.e., it
checks whether
1
T
T∑
k=1
[
Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 )
]2
∈ (Var [W ]− δ,Var [W ] + δ),
(5)
where T is called the test time. That is, as is implied by (4),
the attacker deceives the controller and remains undetected if
1
T
(
L∑
k=1
W 2k +
T∑
k=L+1
(W̃k + (Â− a)Vk)2
)
∈ (Var [W ]− δ,Var [W ] + δ).
C. Performance Measures
Definition 1. The hijack indicator at test time T is defined as
ΘT ,
{
0, ∀j ≤ T : Yj = Xj ;
1, otherwise.
ΘT is an oracle, and at the test time T the controller uses Y T1
to construct an estimate Θ̂T of ΘT . More precisely, Θ̂T = 0
if (5) occurs, otherwise Θ̂T = 1. •
Definition 2. The probability of deception is the probability of
the attacker deceiving the controller and remaining undetected
at the time instant T
P a,TDec , Pa
(
Θ̂T = 0
∣∣∣ΘT = 1) ; (6)
the detection probability at test time T is defined as
P a,TDet , 1− P
a,T
Dec .
Likewise, the probability of false alarm is the probability of
detecting the attacker when it is not present, namely
P a,TFA , Pa
(
Θ̂T = 1
∣∣∣ΘT = 0) . •
Applying Chebyshev’s inequality to (5) and noting that the
system disturbances are i.i.d. Gaussian of variance σ2, we have
PTFA ≤
Var[W 2]
δ2T
=
3σ4
δ2T
.
Further define the deception, detection, and false-alarm prob-
abilities w.r.t. the probability measure P, without conditioning
on A, and denote them by PTDec, P
T
Det, and P
T
FA, respectively.
For instance, PTDet is defined, w.r.t. a PDF fA of A, as
PTDet , P
(
Θ̂T = 1
∣∣∣ΘT = 1) = ∫ ∞
−∞
P a,TDet fA(a)da. (7)
III. STATEMENT OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we describe our main results for the case
of scalar plants. We provide lower and upper bounds on the
deception probability (6) of the learning-based attack (2),
where the estimate Â in (2) may be constructed using an
arbitrary learning algorithm. Our results are valid for any
measurable control policy Uk. We find a lower bound on
the deception probability by characterizing what the attacker
can at least achieve using a least-squares (LS) algorithm, and
we derive an information-theoretic converse for any learning
algorithm using Fano’s inequality [54, Chs. 2.10 & 7.9]. While
our analysis is restricted to the asymptotic case, T →∞, it is
straightforward to extend it to the non-asymptotic case.
For analytical purposes, we assume that the power of the
fictitious sensor reading is equal to β−1 <∞, namely
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k = 1/β a.s. w.r.t. Pa. (8)
Remark 1. Assuming the control policy is memoryless, namely
Uk is only dependent on Yk, the process Vk is Markov for
k ≥ L + 1. By further assuming that L = o(T ) and using
the generalization of the law of large numbers for Markov
processes [55], we deduce
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
V 2k ≥ Var [W ] a.s. w.r.t. Pa.
Hence, in this case, we have β ≤ 1/Var [W ]. Also, when the
control policy is linear and stabilizes (2), that is Uk = −ΩYk
and |Â − Ω| < 1, it is easy to verify that (8) holds true for
β = (1− (Â−Ω)2)/Var [W ]. The assumption in (8) can also
be relaxed as described in Remarks 4 and 6, in the sequel. •
In the following lemma we show that for any learning-based
attack (2), as T → ∞ the empirical variance used in the
variance test (5) can be expressed in terms of the estimation
error. The result follows from the strong law of large numbers
applied to martingale difference sequences [56, Lem. 2, part
iii]; it is proved in App. C-A [52].
Lemma 1. Consider any learning-based attack (2) and any
measurable control policy {Uk} such that the fictitious sensor
reading power satisfies (8). Then, the variance test (5) reduces
a.s., w.r.t. Pa, to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
[Yk+1 − aYk − Uk(Y k1 )]2 = Var [W ] +
(Â−a)2
β
.
A. Lower Bound on the Deception Probability
To provide a lower bound on the deception probability P a,TDec ,
we consider a specific estimate Â at the conclusion of the first
phase by the attacker. Namely, we use LS estimation due to its
efficiency and amenability to recursive update over observed
incremental data [44]–[46]. The LS algorithm approximates
the overdetermined system of equations
X2
X3
...
XL
 = A

X1
X2
...
XL−1
+

U1
U2
...
UL−1
 ,
by minimizing the Euclidean distance Â = argminA
‖Xk+1 −AXk − Uk‖ to estimate (or “identify”) the plant, the
solution to which is
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Â =
∑L−1
k=1 (Xk+1 − Uk)Xk∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
a.s. w.r.t. Pa. (9)
Remark 2. (9) is well-defined since Pa(Xk = 0) = 0, as we
assumed Wk are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian for all k ∈ N. •
We now lower bound the deception probability of an
attacker that utilizes LS estimation (9) under the variance
test and in the presence of any measurable control policy
for which (8) holds. The following theorem demonstrates
the existence of a learning-based attack that satisfies this
lower bound. As other learning algorithms may lead to better
estimates, this also serves as a lower bound on the attacker’s
deception probability in the general case.
Theorem 1. Consider LS (9) learning-based attack (2) and
any measurable control policy {Uk} such that the fictitious
sensor readings satisfy (8). Then, the asymptotic deception
probability under the variance test (5) is lower bounded as
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec = Pa
(
|Â− a| <
√
δβ
)
(10a)
≥ Pa

∣∣∣∑L−1k=1 WkXk∣∣∣∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
<
√
δβ
 (10b)
≥ 1− 2
(1 + δβ)L/2
. (10c)
Proof: (10a) follows from Lem. 1, and the dominated
convergence theorem [55]. For details see App. C-B [52].
Clearly, the estimation error of the LS algorithm (9) is [44]
Â− a =
∑L−1
k=1 WkXk∑L−1
k=1 X
2
k
a.s. w.r.t. Pa. (11)
Consequently, by (10a), a learning-based attack (2) can at least
achieve the asymptotic deception probability (10b). Finally,
(10c) holds by the concentration of measure [44, Th. 4] by
noting that Uk is a measurable function of Y k1 = X
k
1 , for
k ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
Remark 3. We can study the special case of Theorem 1 for a
linear controller. Using the value of β calculated in Remark 1
for a linear controller Uk = −ΩYk when |Â−Ω| < 1, we can
rewrite (10c) as
lim
T→∞
P a,TDec ≥ 1−
2(
1 + δ 1−(Â−Ω)
2
Var[W ]
)L/2 . (12)
In this case, for a fixed L, as Var [W ] increases the lower
bound in (12) decreases. The reduction of the attacker’s suc-
cess rate can be explained by noticing that LS estimation (9) is
based on minimizing ‖Xk+1 −AXk − Uk‖, and the precision
of this estimate decreases as Var [W ] increases. •
Remark 4. By replacing the limit with limsup in the lower
bound in Thm. 1, the result holds even if the limit in (8) does
not exist. Also, if the limit in (8) is infinite then either the
attacker or the controller are doing a poor job, as described
next. Assume the attacker uses an estimate Â such that at
the conclusion of the learning phase Â belongs to the interval
(A − δ′, A + δ′), for a small value of δ′ > 0. In this case, if
Fig. 2: The attacker’s success rate P a,TDec versus the size of the
detection window T .
the power of the fictitious sensor reading tends to infinity, then
the controller is not robust. On the other hand, assume that the
controller stabilizes the system with any open-loop gain that
belongs to the interval (A− δ′, A+ δ′), where δ′ > 0. In this
case, if the power of fictitious sensor tends to infinity, then
the attacker’s estimate at the conclusion of the learning phase,
does not belong to the interval (A−δ′, A+δ′), i.e. the absolute
value of the attacker’s estimation error is larger than δ′.
Example 1. In this example, we compare the empirical
performance of the variance-test with our developed bound
in Thm. 1. At every time T , the controller tests the empirical
variance for anomalies over a detection window [1, T ], using
a confidence interval 2δ > 0 around the expected variance (5).
Here, a = 1, δ = 0.1, Uk = −0.88aYk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ T =
800, and {Wk} are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, 1), and 500 Monte
Carlo simulations were performed.
The learning-based attacker (2) uses the LS algorithm (9) to
estimate a and, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the attacker’s success
rate increases as the duration of the learning phase L increases.
This is in agreement with (10c) since the attacker can improve
its estimate of a and the estimation error |Â − a| reduces
as L increases. As discussed in Sec. II-C, the false alarm
rate decays to zero as the size of the detection window T
tends to infinity. Hence, for a sufficiently large detection
window, the attacker’s success rate could potentially tend to
one. Indeed, such behavior is observed in Fig. 2 for a learning-
based attacker (2) with L = 400. Fig. 2 also illustrates that our
learning-based attack outperforms the replay attack. A replay
attack with a recording length of L = 20 and a learning-based
attack with a learning phase of length L = 20 are compared,
and the success rate of the replay attack saturates at a lower
value. Moreover, a learning-based attack with a learning phase
of length L = 8 has a higher success rate than a replay attack
with a larger recording length of L = 20. •
B. Upper Bound on the Deception Probability
We now derive an upper bound on the deception proba-
bility (6) of any learning-based attack (2) where Â in (2)
is constructed using any arbitrary learning algorithm, for
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any measurable control policy, when A is distributed over
a symmetric interval [−R,R]. Since the uniform distribution
has the highest entropy among all distributions with finite
support [54, Ch. 12], we assume that A has a uniform prior
over the interval [−R,R]. We further assume that the attacker
knows this distribution (including the value of R), whereas the
controller knows the true realization of A (as before).
Theorem 2. For any R > 0, let A be distributed uniformly
over [−R,R], and consider any measurable control policy
{Uk} and any learning-based attack (2) such that the fictitious
sensor readings satisfy (8) with
√
δβ ≤ R. Then, the asymp-
totic deception probability, when using the variance test (5),
is upper bounded as
lim
T→∞
PTDec = P(|A− Â| <
√
δβ) (13a)
≤ Λ , I(A;Z
L
1 ) + 1
log(R/
√
δβ)
. (13b)
In addition, if for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}, A→ (Xk, Zk−11 )→ Uk
is a Markov chain, then for any sequence of probability
measures {QXk|Zk−11 }, such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}
PXk|Zk−11  QXk|Zk−11 , we have
Λ ≤
∑L
k=1D
(
PXk|Zk−11 ,A
∥∥∥QXk|Zk−11 ∣∣∣PZk−11 ,A)+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) .(14)
Proof: (13a) follows from (7), (10a), and Tonelli’s theo-
rem [55]. For details see App. D [52]. (13b) follows by noting
that since the attacker observes the plant state and control
input during the learning phase which lasts L steps, and since
A → (XL1 , UL1 ) → Â constitutes a Markov chain, using the
continuous domain version of Fano’s inequality [57, Prop. 2],
we have
inf
Â
P
(∣∣∣Â−A∣∣∣ ≥√δβ) ≥ 1− I(A;ZL1 ) + 1
log(R/
√
δβ)
,
whenever
√
δβ ≤ R. Finally, (14) follows the arguments of
[58] and is proven, for completeness, in App. D-B [52].
Remark 5. By looking at the numerator in (13b), it follows that
the bound on the deception probability becomes looser as the
amount of information revealed about the open-loop gain A by
the observation ZL1 increases. On the other hand, by looking
at the denominator, the bound becomes tighter as R increases.
This is consistent with the observation of Zames [58] that
system identification becomes harder as the uncertainty about
the open-loop gain of the plant increases. In our case, a larger
uncertainty interval R corresponds to a poorer estimation of
A by the attacker, which leads, in turn, to a decrease in the
achievable deception probability. The denominator can also be
interpreted as the intrinsic uncertainty of A when it is observed
at resolution
√
δβ, as it corresponds to the entropy of the
random variable A when it is quantized at such resolution. •
In conclusion, Thm. 2 provides two upper bounds on the
deception probability. The first bound (13b) clearly shows that
increasing the privacy of the open-loop gain A—manifested
in the mutual information between A and the state-and-
control trajectory ZL1 during the exploration phase—reduces
Fig. 3: Comparison of the lower and upper bounds on the
deception probability, of Thm. 1 and Corol. 1, respectively.
the deception probability. The second bound (14) allows free-
dom in choosing the auxiliary probability measure QXk|Zk−11 ,
making it a rather useful bound. For instance, by choosing
QXk|Zk−11 ∼ N (0, σ
2), for all k ∈ N, we can rewrite the upper
bound (14) in term of EP
[
(AXk−1 + Uk−1)
2
]
as follows. The
proof of the following corollary can be found in [52].
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Thm. 2, if for all k ∈
{1, . . . , L}, A → (Xk, Zk−11 ) → Uk is a Markov chain, then
the asymptotic deception probability upper bounded as
lim
T→∞
PTDec ≤ G(ZL1 ), (15a)
G(ZL1 ) ,
log e
2σ2
∑L
k=1 EP
[
(AXk−1 + Uk−1)
2
]
+ 1
log
(
R/
√
δβ
) .(15b)
Remark 6. Following the same discussion as in Remark 4, by
replacing the limit with liminf in the upper bound in Thm. 2,
the derived results remain true even if (8) does not happen. •
The next example compares the lower and upper bounds on
the deception probability of Thm. 1 and Corol. 1.
Example 2. Thm. 1 provides a lower bound on the deception
probability given A = a. Hence, by applying the law of
total probability w.r.t. the PDF fA as in (7), we can apply
the result of Thm. 1 to provide a lower bound also on the
average deception probability for a random open-loop gain A.
In this context, Fig. 3 compares the lower and upper bounds
on the deception probability provided by Thm. 1 and Corol. 1,
augmented with the trivial cases of zero and one probability,
namely max{0, 1 − (2/(1 + δβ)L/2)}, and min{1, G(ZL1 )},
where A is distributed uniformly over [−0.9, 0.9]. Equation
(15a) is valid when the control input is not a function of
random variable A; hence, we assumed Uk = −0.045Yk for all
time k ∈ N. Here δ = 0.1, {Wk} are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero
mean and variance of 0.16, and for simplicity, we assume the
limit in (8) exists [cf. Remarks 4 and 6], and we let β = 1.1.
Although in general the attacker’s estimation of the random
open-loop gain A and consequently the power of fictitious
sensor reading (8) vary based on the learning algorithm and
the realization of A, the comparison of the lower and upper
bounds in Fig. 3 is restricted to a fixed β. 2000 Monte Carlo
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Fig. 4: The attacker’s success rate P a,TDec versus the duration of
the learning phase L.
simulations were performed.
Fig. 3 also illustrates the gap between these lower and upper
bounds on the deception probability. By restricting the class
of control policies or learning algorithms one might be able
to derive tighter results at the cost of losing generality. •
C. Privacy-enhancing Signal
For a given duration of the learning phase L, to increase the
security of the system, at any time k the controller can add
a privacy-enhancing signal Γk to an unauthenticated control
policy {Ūk|k ∈ N}:
Uk = Ūk + Γk , k ∈ N. (16)
We refer to such a control policy Uk as the authenticated
control policy Ūk. We denote the states of the system that
would be generated if only the unauthenticated control sig-
nal Ūk1 were applied by X̄
k
1 , and the resulting trajectory—by
Z̄k1 , (X̄
k
1 , Ū
k
1 ).
The following numerical example illustrates the effect of
the privacy-enhancing signal on the deception probability.
Example 3. Here, the attacker uses the LS algorithm (9), the
detector uses the variance test (5), a = 1, T = 600, δ =
0.1, and {Wk} are i.i.d. standard Gaussian. We compare the
attacker’s success rate, the empirical P a,TDec , as a function of
the duration L of the learning phase for three different control
policies: I) unauthenticated control signal Ūk1 = −aYk for
all k, II) authenticated control signal (16), where Γk are i.i.d.
Gaussian N (0, 9), III) authenticated control signal (16), where
Γk are i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, 16). As illustrated in Fig. 4, for
both the authenticated and unauthenticated control signals, the
attacker’s success rate increases as the duration of the learning
phase increases. This is in agreement with (10c) since the
attacker can improve its estimate of a as L increases. Further,
for a fixed L the attacker performance deteriorates as the power
of privacy-enhancing signal Γk increases. Namely, Γk hampers
the learning process of the attacker and the estimation error
|Â−a| increases as the power of the privacy-enhancing signal
increases. 500 Monte Carlo simulations were performed. •
Remark 7. A “good” privacy-enhancing signal entails little in-
crease in the control cost [59] compared to its unauthenticated
version while providing enhanced detection probability (6)
and/or false alarm probability. Finding the optimal privacy-
enhancing signal is left for future research. We remark that
since the submission of this paper [1], [52], some latter
literature has appeared that builds on it. In particular, in
a follow-up work [60], Ziemann and Sandberg focused on
designing optimal privacy-enhancing signal, by studying the
optimal control problem of linear systems regularized with
Fisher information, where the latter serves as a proxy to the
estimation quality of A via the Cramer–Rao lower bound. •
One may envisage that superimposing any noisy signal Γk
on top of the control policy {Ūk|k ∈ N} would necessarily
enhance the detectability of any learning-based attack (2)
since the observations of the attacker are in this case noisier.
However, it turns out that injecting a strong noise for some
learning algorithm may, in fact, speed up the learning process
as it improves the power of the signal magnified by the
open-loop gains with respect to the observed noise [44]. Any
signal Γk that satisfies the condition proposed in the following
corollary, whose proof available in [52], will provide enhanced
guarantees on the detection probability when the attacker uses
any arbitrary learning algorithm to estimate the uniformly
distributed A over the symmetric interval [−R,R].
Corollary 2. For any control policy {Ūk|k ∈ N} with tra-
jectory Z̄k1 = (X̄
k
1 , Ū
k
1 ) and its corresponding authenticated
control policy Uk1 (16) with trajectory Z
k
1 = (X
k
1 , U
k
1 ), under
the assumptions of Corollary 1, if for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}
EP
[
Ψ2k + 2Ψk(AX̄k + Ūk)
]
< 0, (17)
where Ψk ,
∑k
j=1A
k−jΓj , for any L ≥ 2, the following
majorization of G (15b) holds:
G(ZL1 ) < G(Z̄
L
1 ). (18)
Remark 8. Corol. 2 can be generalized by replacing the limit
with liminf in (8) [cf. Remarks 4 and 6]. •
Example 4. In this example, we describe a class of privacy-
enhancing signals that yield better guarantees on the decep-
tion probability. For all k ∈ {2, . . . , L}, clearly, Ψk−1 =
−(AX̄k−1 + Ūk−1)/η satisfies the condition in (17) for any
η ≥ 3. Thus, by choosing the privacy-enhancing signals
Γ1 = −(AX̄1 + Ū1)/η, and Γk = −(AX̄k + Ūk)/η −∑k−1
j=1 A
k−1−jΓj for all k ∈ {3, . . . , L}, (18) holds. A
numerical example for this authentication policy demonstrates
a decrease in the deception probability at the expense of a
higher control cost, and it can be found in App. B-A [52]. •
Remark 9. The privacy-enhancing signal introduced in this
work is related to the dynamic watermarking signal [26], [29],
[30], which are unique signatures that are available only to the
controller. In contrast, in our setup (depicted in Fig. 1b), the
attacker has access to the signal generated by the controller.
Thus, by reading the control input at time k and constructing
the ficticous sensor reading Vk+1, as in (2), the attacker can
construct a fictitious sensor reading containing any watermark
signal inscribed by the controller. It follows that techniques
based on dynamic watermarking that rely on the privacy of
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such signal break down in the case where attacks have access
to the control signal generated by the controller. Instead, we
take advantage of the authentication signal in a different way:
since the attacker does not have full knowledge about the
system dynamics, this signal is used to hamper the learning
process of the attacker during the learning phase. •
IV. EXTENSION TO VECTOR SYSTEMS
We now generalize our results to vector systems. Consider
the networked control system depicted in Fig. 1, with the plant
dynamics replaced by a vector plant:
xk+1 = Axk + uk + wk, (19)
where xk ∈ Rn×1, uk ∈ Rn×1, A ∈ Rn×n, wk ∈ Rn×1
represent the plant state, control input, open-loop gain of the
plant, and plant disturbance, respectively, at time k ∈ N. The
controller, at time k, observes yk and generates a control signal
uk as a function of yk1 , and yk = xk at times k ∈ N at
which the attacker does not tamper the sensor reading. We
assume that the initial condition x0 has a known (to all parties)
distribution and is independent of the disturbance sequence
{wk}. For analytical purposes, we further assume {wk} is a
process with i.i.d. multivariate Gaussian samples of zero mean
and a covariance matrix Σ that is known to all parties. Without
loss of generality, we assume that w0 = 0, E [x0] = 0, and
take u0 = 0.
We assume the attacker uses the vector analogue of learning
based attacks described in Sec. II-A where the attacker can use
any learning algorithm to estimate the open-loop gain matrix
A during the learning phase. The estimation Â constructed by
the attacker at the conclusion of the learning phase is utilized
to construct the fictitious sensor readings {vk} according to
the vector analogue of (2), where {w̃k|k = L, . . . , T − 1}
are i.i.d. multivariate Gaussian with zero mean and covariance
matrix Σ.
Similar to the scalar case, for analytical purposes, we
assume that the power of the fictitious sensor reading is equal
to 1/β <∞ [cf. Remarks 1 and 4], namely
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
‖vk‖2 =
1
β
a.s. w.r.t. PA . (20)
Since the zero-mean multivariate Gaussian distribution is
completely characterized by its covariance matrix, we shall
follow [29] and test for anomalies in the latter. To that end,
define the error matrix
∆ , Σ− 1
T
T∑
k=1
[
yk+1 − Ayk − uk
] [
yk+1 − Ayk − uk
]†
.
As in (5), we use a test that sets a confidence interval, with
respect to the norm, around the expected covariance matrix,
i.e., it checks whether
‖∆‖op ≤ γ, (21)
at the test time T . For the sake of analysis, we use the operator
norm in (21), which satisfies the sub-multiplicativity property.
The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for any learning-based attack [the vector analogue
of (2)] to deceive the controller and remain undetected, for
a multivariate plant (19) under a covariance test (21), in the
limit of T →∞; its proof is available in [52].
Lemma 2. Consider the multivariate plant (19), and any
learning-based attack analogous to (2), with fictitious sensor
reading power that satisfies (20), and any measurable control
policy {uk}. Then, the attacker can deceive the controller and
remain undetected, under the covariance test (21), a.s. in the
limit T →∞, if and only if
lim
T→∞
1
T
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
k=L+1
(Â− A)vkv†k(Â− A)
†
∥∥∥∥∥
op
≤ γ. (22)
Lem. 2 has the following important implication.
lim
T→∞
1
T
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
k=L+1
(Â− A)vkv†k(Â− A)
†
∥∥∥∥∥
op
(23a)
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
∥∥∥(Â− A)vk((Â− A)vk)†∥∥∥
op
(23b)
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=L+1
∥∥∥(Â− A)vk∥∥∥2
op
(23c)
≤
∥∥∥Â− A∥∥∥2
op
/β , (23d)
where (23b) follows from the triangle inequality, (23c) and
(23d) follow from the sub-multiplicativity of the operator, the
identity ‖vk‖ = ‖vk‖op and by putting the power constraint
(20) into force.
If ‖Â − A‖2op ≤ γβ, (22) holds in the limit of T → ∞,
then the attacker is able to deceive the controller and remain
undetected a.s., by Lem. 2. Equation (23) then implies that
the norm of the estimation error, ‖Â−A‖op, dictates the ease
with which an attack can go undetected. This is used next to
develop a lower bound on the deception probability.
A. Lower Bound on the Deception Probability
We start by observing that in the case of multivariate
systems, and in contrast to their scalar counterparts, some
control actions might not reveal the entire plant dynamics, and
in this case the attacker might not be able to learn the plant
completely. This phenomenon is captured by the persistent
excitation property of control inputs, which describes control-
action signals that are sufficiently rich to excite all the system
modes that will allow to learn them. While avoiding persis-
tently exciting control inputs can be used as a way to secure
the system against learning-based attacks, here, we assume a
probabilistic variant of this property [58], [61].
Definition 3 (Persistent excitation). Given a plant (19), ζ >
0, and ρ ∈ [0, 1], the control policy uk is (ζ, ρ)-persistently
exciting if there exists a time L0 ∈ N such that, for all τ ≥ L0,
PA
(
1
τ
Gτ  ζIn×n
)
≥ ρ, (24)
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where Gτ is the sum of the state Gramians up to time τ :
Gτ ,
τ∑
k=1
xkx†k. (25)
As in Sec. III-A, to find a lower bound on the deception
probability P A,TDec , we consider a specific estimate of A, ob-
tained via the LS estimation algorithm, analogous to (9), at
the conclusion of the first phase by the attacker:
Â =

0n×n, det(GL−1) = 0;
L−1∑
k=1
(xk+1 − uk)x†kG
−1
L−1, otherwise,
(26)
where 0k×` denotes an all zero matrix of dimensions k × `.
Next, we show an upper bound on the estimation-error
norm, ‖Â − A‖op, of the above LS algorithm (26), and use
it to extend the bound in (10) to the vector case. A complete
proof is available in [52].
Lemma 3. Consider the vector plant (19). If the attacker
constructs Â using LS estimation (26), and the controller uses
a policy {uk} for which the event in (24) occurs for τ = L−1,
that is GL−1/(L− 1)  ζIn×n. Then, we have
‖Â− A‖op ≤
1
ζL
L−1∑
k=1
‖wkx†k‖op a.s. w.r.t. PA . (27)
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the
deception probability of an attacker that utilizes LS estima-
tion (26), and its proof can be found in [52]. As discussed
before Thm. 1, since the attacker might be able to construct
better estimates using other learning algorithms, this also
serves as a lower bound on the attacker’s deception probability
in the general case.
Theorem 3. Consider the plant (19) with a (ζ, ρ)-persistently
exciting control policy {Uk} from time L0, and LS (26)
learning-based attack [the vector analogue of (2)] such that
the fictitious sensor reading power satisfies (20) and with a
learning phase of duration L ≥ L0 + 1. Then, the asymptotic
deception probability, when using the covariance test (21), is
bounded from below as
lim
T→∞
P A,TDec ≥ PA
(
‖Â− A‖op <
√
γβ
)
(28a)
≥ ρPA
(
1
ζL
L−1∑
k=1
‖wkx†k‖op <
√
γβ
)
. (28b)
Remark 10. The bound (10c) for scalar systems, which is
independent of the control policy and state value, has been
developed using the concentration bounds of [44] for the
scalar LS algorithm (9). To the best of our knowledge, there
are no similar concentration bounds for the vector variant
of the LS algorithm (9) which work for any A, and a large
class of control policies. Looking for such bounds, which are
independent of the state value, seems an interesting research
venue. The lower bound (28b) is similar to (10b), while (10b)
is stronger for the particular case of scalar system, as the upper
bound on the estimation error derived in Lem. 3 is not required
for the scalar case, and the estimation error is given in (11). •
Fig. 5: The attacker’s success rate P A,TDec versus the size of the
detection window T .
Example 5. In this example, we compare the empirical
performance of the covariance test against the learning-based
attack which utilizes LS estimation (26), and the replay
attack. At every time k, the controller tests the empirical
covariance for anomalies over a detection window [1, T ], using
a confidence interval 2γ > 0 around the operator norm of
error matrix ∆ (21). Since we are considering the Euclidean
norm for vectors, the induced operator norm amounts to
‖∆‖op =
√
λmax(∆†∆). Here, γ = 0.1, uk = −0.9Ayk
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ T = 600,
A =
(
1 2
3 4
)
, Σ =
(
1 0
0 2
)
. (29)
Fig. 5 presents the performance averaged over 180 runs of a
Monte Carlo simulation. It illustrates that the vector variant of
our learning-based attack also outperforms the replay attack. A
learning-based attack with a learning phase of length L = 40
has a higher success rate than a replay attack with a larger
recording length of L = 50. Similarly to the discussion for
scalar systems in Sec. II-C, the false-alarm rate decays to zero
as the size of the detection window T tends to infinity. Thus,
the success rate of learning-based attacks increases as the
size of the detection window increases. Finally, as illustrated
in Fig. 5, the attacker’s success rate increases as the duration
of the learning phase L increases, since the attacker improves
its estimate of A as L increases. •
An example that investigates the effect of privacy-enhancing
signals on the empirical deception probability of the learning-
based attacks on the vector systems is in App. B-B [52].
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. Upper Bound on the Deception Probability
The upper bound in (23), which relates the deception
criterion (22) to the estimation error ‖Â−A‖op, is used to find
the lower bound (28). Finding a corresponding lower bound in
term of ‖Â− A‖op for (23a) is the first step in extending our
results in Thm. 2 to vector systems. Finding an upper bound on
the deception probability for vector linear and scalar nonlinear
systems, where the attacker can use any learning algorithm, is
left open for future work.
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B. Model-based vs. Model-free
In this work, we mainly concentrated on linear systems; we
assumed the attacker constructs the fictitious sensor reading,
in a model-based manner, according to the linear model (2)
and its vector variants. In general, as discussed in App. A
available online in [52], the system can be nonlinear, and the
attacker might not be aware of the linearity or non-linearity of
the dynamics. Comparing the deception probability for the vast
range of model-free and model-based learning methods [41],
[45], [62] is an interesting research venue.
C. Continuous Learning and Hijacking
In this work, we assumed two disjoint consecutive phases
(recall Sec. II-A): learning and hijacking, which are akin to the
exploration and exploitation phases of reinforcement learning
(RL) [63]. Indeed, in this two-phase process, the attacker
explores the system until it reaches a desired deception
probability and then moves to the exploitation phase during
which it drives the system to instability as quickly as it can.
The two phases are completely separate due to the inherent
tension between them: exploiting the system without properly
exploring it during the learning (silent) phase increases the
chances of being detected.
Despite the naturalness of two-phase attacks, just like in
RL [63], one may consider more general strategies where
exploration and exploitation are intertwined and gradual: as
time elapses, the attacker can gain better estimates of the
observed system and gradually increase its detection-limited
attack. In these terms, our two-phase attack can be regarded as
a two-stage approximation of the gradual attack and provides
achievability bounds for such attacks. Studying more general
attacks is a research venue that is left for future study.
D. Oblivious Controller
A more realistic scenario is the one in which neither the
attacker nor the controller are aware of the open-loop gain of
the plant. In this scenario, both parties strive to learn the open-
loop gain—posing two conflicting objectives to the controller,
who, on the one hand, wishes to speed up its own learning
process, while, on the other hand, wants to slow down the
learning process of the attacker.
In such a situation, standard adaptive control methods are
clearly insufficient, as no asymmetry between the attacker and
the controller can be achieved under the setting of Sec. II. To
create a security leverage over the attacker, the controller needs
to utilize a judicious privacy-enhancing signal: A properly de-
signed privacy-enhancing signal should enjoy a positive double
effect by facilitating the learning process of the controller
while hindering that of the attacker at the same time. Note
that, in such a scenario, while the controller knows both Ūk
and Γk, the attacker is cognizant of only their sum (16)—Uk.
This is reminiscent of strategic information transfer [64].
Finally, we note that, unless the controller is able to detect
an MITM attack (the attacker’s hijacking phase), its learning
process will be hampered by the fictitious signal that is
generated according to the virtual system of the attacker (2).
E. Moving Target Defense
In our setup the attacker has full access to the control signal
(see Fig. 1), and at time k+1 the attacker uses the control input
Uk to construct the fictitious sensor reading Vk+1 according
to (2). Thus, the watermarking signal [26], the private random
signature, might not be an effective way to counter the learning
based attacks [cf. Remark 9]. Here, we introduced the privacy-
enhancing signal (16) to impede the learning process of
the attacker and decrease the deception probability. Another
technique that has been developed in the literature to counter
attacks, where the attacker has full system knowledge, is
having the controller covertly introduce virtual state variables
unknown to the attacker but that are correlated with the
ordinary state variables, so that modification of the original
states will impact the extraneous states. These extraneous
states can act as a moving target [35]–[38] for the attacker. A
similar technique is the so-called baiting, which adds an offset
to the system dynamic [39], [40]. In practice, this technique
breaks the information symmetry between the attacker—which
has the full system knowledge, and the controller. Using such
defense techniques to hamper the learning process of our
proposed attacker, is an interesting research venue. In this
context, the controller, by potentially sacrificing the optimally
of the control task, can act in an adversarial learning setting.
Assuming that the control can covertly introduce a virtual part
to the dynamics, for any given duration of the learning phase
L (see Fig. 1), sufficiently fast changes in the cipher part of
the dynamic can drastically hamper the learning process of
the attacker. Also, as discussed in App. A [52], adding a rich
nonlinearity to the dynamics can be used as a way to secure
the system against learning-based attacks.
F. Optimal testing
Throughout this work, we have assumed that the controller
tests the integrity of the system at a specific time step T ,
that tends to infinity. Since the controller does not know the
exact time instant at which an attack might occur, a more
realistic scenario would be that of continuous testing, i.e., that
in which the integrity of the system is tested at every time
step and where the false alarm and deception probabilities are
defined with a union over time. We leave this treatment for
future research.
In addition, following [29], we have considered the
variance-based test, which searches for anomalies in the
empirical variance, i.e., whether it falls outside a confidence
interval of length 2δ [cf. (5)]. Studying the optimal detector
for learning-based attacks is an interesting research venue.
G. Further Future Directions
Other future directions can explore the extension of the
established results to partially-observable linear vector systems
where the input (actuation) gain is unknown, characterising
securable and unsecurable subspaces [65] for learning-based
attacks, revising the attacker full access to both sensor and
control signals, designing optimal privacy-enhancing signals
(recall Remark 7) for linear and nonlinear systems, investigat-
ing the scenario in which the attacker is oblivious of the noise
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covariance matrix or more generally the noise statistics, and
studying the relation between our proposed privacy-enhancing
signal with the noise signal utilized to achieve differential
privacy [66]. Finally note that we assume that the attacker
does not know the control strategy applied by the controller
but is privy to the control actions generated by the controller.
In the case where the attacker knows the control policy (or
control objectives), it can do a much better job in learning the
system dynamics, which is an interesting research venue.
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